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INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that the telecommunications industry comprises $3.5
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Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 1996. Thanks to J. Ann Lee and Mark
D. Lunney for their support and encouragement.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
trillion of the world's economy.' American telecommunications manufac-
turers have increasingly sought greater access to this lucrative global
market2 and elimination of trade barriers retarding U.S. penetration into
foreign telecommunications markets. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),3 ratified by the United States in 1993, reduced both
tariff and nontariff barriers that hindered telecommunications trade between
the United States, Mexico, and Canada.4
The use of different product standards is one of the most significant
types of nontariff barriers addressed by the NAFTA. Different product
standards create incompatibility, which discourages users from purchasing
a foreign manufacturer's product. The NAFTA directs its three member
nations to utilize the product standards set by international standard-setting
organizations as the basis for all their standards. Reliance on these
organizations, proponents of the NAFTA argue, will result in global
standards, eliminate incompatibility, and open new markets for trade.
These international organizations, however, face numerous problems
that limit their effectiveness to formulate standards. In light of these
problems, this Note argues that increased reliance on international standard-
setting bodies in their current form, as mandated by the NAFTA, is not in
the best interests of the American telecommunications industry. Part I
discusses the importance of compatibility standards. Part II explains the
NAFTA's impact on the standard-setting process. Part II identifies four
major problems faced by standard-setting bodies, and Part IV examines the
factors that affect standardization. Part V suggests two changes to improve
the current process.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS
A standard is a "set of technical specifications adhered to by a
1. Sumner M. Redstone, Keynote Address, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 133, 134 (1993).
2. See generally NATIONALTELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., PUB. No. 93-290, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA
(1993).
3. U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, 1 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4. In December 1994, the United States, Mexico, and Canada invited Chile to join the
NAFI'A. Originally, the United States projected negotiations would be completed within 15
months. See Tracy Wilkinson & William R. Long, Americas Summit Ends: Clinton Hails
'Watershed', L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al; Michael McQuire, Chile Invited to Be
Fourth NAFTA Partner, CH. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1994, § 1, at 7. However, the Clinton
administration failed to obtain "fast track" powers from Congress to make that possible.
Currently, Chile is not expected to join the NAFTA until 1997. Stephen Fidler, Latin
America Worries about US Trade Shift: US Election Year Concerns Have Gone Beyond the
Usual Ones, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at 5.
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producer, either tacitly or as a result of a formal agreement."' Several
types of product standards exist. They include reference, minimum quality,
and compatibility standards.6 Minimum quality and reference standards
assure consumers that a product, if it has met those standards, will perform
at a particular level.7 A compatibility standard certifies that a telecommuni-
cations product is fully operational within a network of similar equipment.8
Different manufacturers may produce similar products. However, if all
manufacturers adhere to the same compatibility standard, consumers can
utilize those products in the same network. 9
A. Benefits of Standardization
Standardization offers many benefits to the manufacturers, service
providers, and users in the telecommunications sector. Compatibility
decreases costs,'0 reduces the need for translators," and increases
consumer welfare. 2 A user gains greater utility from the consumption of
a particular good when all other persons consume a good compatible with
the user's product.'" For example, the number of users of a particular
personal computer affects the quantity and diversity of software available
for the computer. 4 Furthermore, compatibility permits consumers to use
all aspects of a system or network"5 and gives users more freedom to
choose the brand name product that best suits their particular needs. 6
Compatibility also reduces the possibility of "premature" technologi-
5. Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards:An
Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3, 4 (1990).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. D.M. CERNI & E.M. GRAY, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., PuB. No. 83-15, INTERNATION-
AL TELECOMMUNICATIONSTANDARDS: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE '80s 50 (1983).
9. David & Greenstein, supra note 5, at 4.
10. Yale M. Braunstein & Lawrence J. White, Setting Technical Compatibility
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 30 ANTrrRUST BULL. 337, 337 (1985).
11. Id. at 343. A translator is a "low-cost 'add-on'" that allows a consumer to utilize
an otherwise incompatible technology. Id. at 340. An example of a translator is the Personal
MacLAN Connect that allows Macintosh users to access a PC's files, send files to a
PC printer, and use a PC's hard disk, floppy drive, and CD-ROM. Carol S. Holzberg,
Seamless Mac and PC Connectivity: MacLAN Enables Macintosh and Windows Users to
Share Files, Folders, Drives, and Printers, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Nov. 1993, available in
LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
12. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 337.
13. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
14. Id.
15. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 343.
16. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 52.
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cal obsolescence.' 7 Users are more likely to purchase a communications
technology if manufacturers cannot produce an incompatible commodity. 8
Compatibility increases the product's value to consumers. An incompatible
commodity lessens the value of the product the consumer purchased.' 9
Moreover, future users gain from a current user's experience with a
particular technology.' Manufacturers use consumer feedback to improve
upon a technology. Thus, future consumers buy a better product.
Manufacturers and service providers also benefit from compatibility
standards. Standards create a larger and more competitive market.2' They
may promote price competition among manufacturers.' Furthermore,
compatibility standards prevent manufacturers from wasting resources by
producing duplicative equipment that is not interoperable.?
Service providers, such as telephone and data network providers,
profit as well. Providers must invest significant amounts of money in
hardware and technology.' Service providers are reluctant to invest
without a "guaranteed" user market. Compatibility creates the needed user
market.' Thus, as a result of the proliferation of standards, providers are
more willing to invest in the necessary equipment.'
B. Drawbacks to Standardization
Clearly, standardization has many benefits. However, standardization
also has drawbacks. Compatibility may result in the loss of a technology
with unique characteristicsY Some consumers may, in fact, highly value
those unique services that a particular technology provides.' Standardiza-
tion, therefore, reduces the variety of available goods and consumer choice.
Moreover, once a standard is adopted, it is difficult to change. In some
cases, the adoption of a standard may retard market penetration of
technologies superior to the one employed.29 Standards formulated for
17. STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., R-3453-NSF,
COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS, COMPETITION, AND INNOVATION IN THE BROADCASTING
INDuSTRY 8 (1986).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 52.
22. BESEN & JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 8.
23. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 343.
24. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 53.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 343.
28. Id.
29. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 53.
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products not yet marketed compound this risk." Without experience and
consumer feedback, manufacturers and standard-setting bodies cannot
assure consumers that they are adopting a practicable standard, let alone the
best standard.
Consumers may not be the only losers. Manufacturers whose
technology is not adopted as the standard are forced to scrap their
products.' This results in wasted resources. Moreover, manufacturers
whose technology is adopted as the standard have a competitive edge over
the losing manufacturers. The winners have experience manufacturing
goods that meet those compatibility standards, and they may retain patent
rights to particular standards.' Manufacturers with those rights can raise
the operating costs of its competitors.3 Higher manufacturing costs force
competitors to reduce output,36 which allows the dominant manufacturer
to raise its prices. Such activity may force competitors to leave the
market.38 It may also create barriers to entry and harm industrial
competitiveness. 39
Manufacturers may also interpret compatibility standards different-
ly.'° For example, many countries have adopted the X.25 network
standard promulgated by the International Telegraph and Telephone
Consultative Committee (CCITT).4" However, each country has applied
the standards differently.42 Many nations have rewritten the standards for
their benefit.43 Without sufficient clarification, these standards fail to
provide the compatibility for which they were designed.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 343.
33. Id.
34. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets,
RAND J. ECON. 235, 238 (1988).
35. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AMER. ECON.
REV. 267, 267 (1983).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Braunstein & White, supra note 10, at 343.
40. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 53.
41. Id. X.25 is the CCITT and Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) standard for packet-
switching networks that provide channels up to 64 Kbps. Examples of X.25 networks
include British Telecom, AT&T, and CompuServe. See Patricia Schnaidt, Glossary:
Networking Terms, LAN MAGAZM, Dec. 1993, at 21, 23-24.
42. Cerni & Gray, supra note 8, at 53.
43. Id.
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II. THE NAFTA AND THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
The NAFTA was signed on December 17, 1992 by American
President George Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.' The U.S. Senate ratified the
NAFTA on November 20, 1993 by a vote of 61 to 38.1 The treaty has
six key components: market access, trade regulation, foreign investment
laws, intellectual property laws, service businesses, and dispute settle-
ment.' It essentially creates a free-trade zone in North America. Six
months after the treaty took effect, U.S. exports to Mexico rose to $24.5
billion, a $3.5 billion increase from the year before.47
Chapter 13 of the NAFTA, which deals exclusively with telecommu-
nications, received high marks from industry representatives. 41 It man-
44. Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 2362 (Dec. 17, 1992).
45. S. 1627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. 1356 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993)
(enacted). The House of Representatives approved the NAFTA by a vote of 234 to 200.
H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. 1319 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993)
(enacted).
46. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 102; Business Law Symposium, NAFTA: Overview
of Legal, Economic and Practical Issues, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 915 (1993).
47. The NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994. See Robert Keatley, Reaping the
Benefits: A Look at Some U.S. Companies Poised to Take Advantage of NAFTA, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 1994, at R4. In 1995, the United States had a $15.4 billion trade deficit with
Mexico, the first in five years. The trade deficit was due to the devaluation of the Mexican
peso and a 6% drop in Mexico's gross domestic product. However, U.S. exports to Mexico
were 11% higher than in 1993. Struggling Partner, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1996, at 28,
28.
The debate about whether the United States should have signed the NAFTA continues
to rage. For criticism of the NAFTA, see 141 CONG. REc. S17,513 (daily ed. Nov. 27,
1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan); and 141 CONG. REC. H14,026 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Velazquez). Opponents of the NAFTA also have sponsored the NAFTA
Accountability Act, H.R. 2651, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which terminates
congressional approval of the NAFTA unless certain conditions are met. Others continue
to fully support the treaty. See generally Execs Support NAFTA, USA TODAY, Feb. 22,
1996, at Al; Tom Nutile, On State Street: Kantor Defends NAFTA, BOSTON HERALD, Oct.
31, 1995, at 29; Testimony Oct. 25, 1995 Jim Kolbe Congressman House International
Relations Western Hemisphere South American Trade Issues, Fed'l Doc. Clearing House
Cong. Testimony, Oct. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
48. NAFTA Provisions on Telecommunication Get High Marks at Industry Conference,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 16, 1992, at 221, 221; Science and Technology Week:
High-Tech Industries See Bright Future With NAFTA (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 13,
1993). For additional information on Chapter 13, see Ivan H. Shefrin, The North American
Free Trade Agreement: Telecommunications in Perspective, TELECOMM. POL'Y, Jan./Feb.
1993, at 14; Alexandra Field, Current Developments in the FCC: Telecommunications and
the NAFTA, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus., Mar. 22, 1994, at 1145; U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE
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dates that Mexico, Canada, and the United States ensure reasonable and
nondiscriminatory access to international and domestic public telecommuni-
cations networks used -to provide value-added49 and intracorporate
telecommunications services throughout North America.' It ordered
the removal of Mexican restrictions on American and Canadian foreign
investment in all value-added telecommunications services by July 1995.2
The treaty also forces the three nations to price public telecommunications
network services based on actual cost. Moreover, it penalizes nations for
using technical product standards as barriers to trade in telecommunications
services.-
A driving force behind the NAFTA was the desire to eliminate the use
of standard-related measures of telecommunication products and other
products as nontariff barriers to trade.' A nontariff barrier includes all
regulations of trade other than import taxes into a country.55 A nation
imposes a nontariff barrier to protect its domestic industries from foreign
domination.56 A standards-related measure serves as a nontariff barrier to
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, Pub: 2596 (Part 4), Jan. 1993; and Richard
H. Steinberg, What the North American Free Trade Agreement Means to Business: An
Industry-by-Industry Analysis of Effects and Opportunities, 9 CORP. CouNs. Q. 52, 68-70
(1993).
49. As defined by the NAFTA, value-added services are telecommunications services
that use computer processing applications that: "(a) act on the format, content, code,
protocol or similar aspects of a customer's transmitted information; (b) provide a customer
with additional, different or restructured information; or (c) involve customer interaction
with stored information." NAFTA, supra note 3 at art. 1310. Examples of such services
are voice mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, data capture and storage, and on-line
database access. Andrew C. Gross et. al., Industry Corner: Global Telecommunications: The
Market and the Industry, Bus. ECON., Oct. 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library,
Compub File.
50. Intracorporate communications signify the means through which a business entity
'communicates: (a) internally or with or among subsidiaries, branches or affiliates, as
defined by each Party, or (b) on a non-commercial basis with other persons that are
fundamental to the economic activity of the enterprise and that have a continuing contractual
relationship with it .... " NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 1310.
51. Harry G. Broadman, International Trade and Investment in Services:A Comparative
Analysis of the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAW 623, 642 (1993).
52. Id. On June 8, 1995, Mexico passed its first federal telecommunications law, which
eliminated all restrictions on foreign investment in value-added services. Cheryl Schechter
& Maggie Miqueo, New Telecom Law Opens Market, Reduces Role of Government, LATIN
AM. LAW & Bus. REP., July 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub
File.
53. Id.
54. Anne M. Driscoll, Key Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Bus. AM., Oct. 19, 1992, at 3, 7-8.
55. RHONDA J. CRANE, THE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: FRANCE
AND THE COLOR TV WAR 41 (1979).
56. Id.
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trade when a country's product standards differ from that of another. The
incompatibility between the two products prevents market penetration by
the country seeking entry into a particular market.
Chapter 9 of the NAFTA deals exclusively with these standard-related
measures. Article 904(4) prohibits the use of standards-related measures as
nontariff barriers to trade. It states "no Party may prepare, adopt, maintain
or apply any standards-related measures with a view to or with the effect
of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between the parties. "' Article
906(2) then mandates that the "Parties shall to the greatest extent
practicable make compatible their respective standards-related measures, so
as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties."58 Article
905(1) then states that "[e]ach Party shall use, as a basis for its standards-
related measures, relevant international standards or international standards
whose completion is imminent . . . ." Moreover, a nation's standards-
related measures that conform to an international standard are presumed to
be consistent with Article 904.
Articles 904 to 906 essentially make what were once permissible
standards promulgated by international standardization organizations
mandatory ones. Articles 904 to 906 also compel the telecommunications
industry to adopt cooperative standard-setting as the sole method used to
achieve standardization. 6  Cooperative standard-setting occurs when
market participants voluntarily delegate compatibility decision-making
authority to standardization organizations. These organizations attempt to
arrive at a consensus among the participants and exist at industry-wide,
national, and international levels. The NAFTA relies exclusively on
cooperative standard-setting to formulate product standards.
57. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 904(4).
58. Id. at art. 906(2).
59. Id. at art. 905(1).
60. Id. at art. 905(2).
61. Prior to the NAFTA, two methods had been used to achieve standardization in the
telecommunications industry: noncooperative and cooperative standard-setting. Noncoopera-
tive standard-setting occurs when market participants make the standardization decisions.
For more on noncooperative standard-setting, see Stanley M. Besen & Garth Saloner,
RAND, P-7393, COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS AND THE MARKET FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES 21-26 (1988); Besen & Johnson, supra note 17, at 22-26; Braunstein & White,
supra note 10, at 345-49; and Katz & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 434-39.
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A. Structure and Procedure of Key Cooperative Standard-Setting
Organizations
1. International Telecommunications Union
The two principal cooperative standardization organizations in the
telecommunications industry are the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
The ITU is the only standardization organization that exclusively develops
telecommunications standards.62 The ITU's initial involvement in interna-
tional standardization concerned telephony.63 However, the ITU's work
today covers all telecommunications services. Its activities are divided into
three sectors: development, radio communications, and standardization."
The standardization sector is divided into Technical Study Groups,
which formulate standards for various telecommunications products. The
Standardization Advisory Group coordinates standardization activities
among those Study Groups within the ITU and other external standard-
setting bodies. Moreover, it reviews the progress made in the various Study
Groups and resets their goals if necessary.' The Standardization Activity
Group also allows manufacturing representatives and users to evaluate and
to contribute to the standardization process. However, the Group has no
formal authority.' It cannot vote on proposed standards.
In addition, the ITU has a Standardization Bureau to address users'
concerns that their current technology might be incompatible with future
technologies. The Bureau evaluates whether proposed standards will permit
users to continue to operate their old technology. The Bureau also ensures
that technologies developed now can later adapt to future ones. Moreover,
the Bureau revises Study Group questions as the needs of manufacturers,
users, and service providers change between Plenipotentiary Conferenc-
es.
67
62. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 4.
63. ANDREW MACPHERSON, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS
ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1990).
64. New Structure of the ITU, EXCHANGE, Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedcom
Library, Compub File. For ITU history, see generally MACPHERSON, supra note 63.
65. Nitin Shankar, Setting a New Standard, COMM. INT'L, Dec. 1992, available in
LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Plenipotentiary Conference convenes every five to nine years. See CERNI
& GRAY, supra note 8, at 5. The ITU's general policy, constitution, and articles of
convention are determined at this Conference. The member nations also elect the directors
of the various sectors at this Conference. See MACPHERSON, supra note 63, at 17.
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2. International Organization for Standardization
Similar to the ITU, the ISO plays a significant role in the development
of communications standards. However, the ISO deals with standardization
issues in diverse fields, such as agriculture, nuclear-powered systems, and
fabrics.6" Currently, the ISO has seventy-three members69 and is a
nontreaty organization of the United Nations.7' Each nation is allowed one
representative.7' The United States' representative is the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI).
ISO members can be categorized into two groups. Organizations such
as ANSI comprise the first group. These organizations are voluntary.
Private members, not the government, fund the activities of these
organizations. However, some nations' representatives may work for their
respective governments. ISO members in the second group are funded by
their government, but permit some corporate involvement. 72
The ISO's technical committees and subcommittees perform the bulk
of standardization.' However, member and nonmember organizations of
the ISO can request the formation of a technical committee to address any
standardization issue that is international in scope. Member nations then
vote on the proposed committee. A committee is created if a majority of
the member nations support the proposal and if a minimum of five member
nations are willing to actively participate in the committee. Once formed,
the committee is chaired by a member nation that reports to the ISO
Council.74
The technical committees then formulate standards. Member nations
vote on the proposed recommendations at the General Assembly or by
written ballot. 5 The General Assembly convenes only once every three
years. Thus, the majority of voting occurs via written ballot. 76 Similar to
the ITU, the recommendations, even if agreed to by a majority of the
member states, do not bind the ISO's member states. ISO members may
choose to follow or ignore the standards. 7 Furthermore, the ISO re-
68. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 10-11.
69. MACPHERSON, supra note 63, at 95.
70. GERD WALLENSTEIN, SETTING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: THE
STAKES, THE PLAYERS & THE PROCESS 85 (1990).
71. MACPHERSON, supra note 63, at 96.
72. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 11.
73. Id. at 12.
74. MACPHERSON, supra note 63, at 102-03.
75. Id. at 97.
76. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 13.
77. MACPHERSON, supra note 63, at 97.
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evaluates its recommended standards every five years. 8
III. PROBLEMS FACED BY STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
A. Delays
The ITU's own members and directors, as well as industry leaders,
have criticized the delays in the standardization process. On average, the
ITU has taken four years to formulate a standard.79 In 1992, the ITU was
restructured to its current form to make the standardization process more
efficient. It is yet to be seen whether the ITU will actually promugate
standards faster due to the recent restructuring. Some ITU chairpersons
have criticized the restructuring effort for inadequately dealing with the
needs of member nations in a rapidly changing telecommunications
industry. W. H. Bellchambers, the current vice-chairperson of the ITU's
Radio Regulations Board, argues that an even more efficient structure will
not prevent the decline of the ITU's influence on telecommunications.' °
Regional standardization organizations (RSOs) have developed in
response to the inefficiencies of the ITU and now compete with the ITU in
the formulation of standards.81 In fact, the RSOs were formed to develop
standards faster than the ITU. 2 Similar to the ITU, the RSOs attempt to
reach consensus among all parties.' Given the smaller number of
participants in the RSOs, consensus is easier to reach. However, if
consensus cannot be achieved, the RSOs' procedural rules contain
provisions to break the deadlock. For example, the Exchange Carriers
Standards Association (ECSA) permits approval, withdrawal, or revision
of a standard if only two-thirds of its members agree. s4
The ITU's ineffective voting procedures, however, have not been the
only reasons for the growing reliance on the RSOs. First, concern arose
that the ITU's process excludes the opinions of private telecommunications
manufacturers and limits voting rights to representatives selected by the
78. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 13.
79. Marcel Werner, 1TU Making Standardization More Competitive, TELECOMM., July
1993, at 10, 10.
80. Summit Poses Questions About 1TU Role in the 1990s, FINTECH TELECOM
MARKETS, Apr. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
81. RSOs include the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the T1
Committee of the Exchange Carriers Standards Association (ECSA) in the United States,
and the Telecommunications Technology Committee (TrC) in Japan. See Stanley M. Besen
& Joseph Farrell, The Role of the 1TU in Standardization: Pre-eminence, Impotence or
Rubber Stamp?, TELECOMM. POLICY, Aug. 1991, at 311, 311.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 314.
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governments of member nations. When governments were both manufactur-
ers and regulators of telecommunications, the ITU's structure gave
manufacturers and regulators a forum to articulate their needs. However,
now that governments principally regulate the industry and private
companies produce the hardware, the ITU excludes the voice of manufac-
turers. Comparatively the RSOs involve more participants. For example,
local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers, and equipment manufactur-
ers comprise the ECSA.' Thus, standards produced by RSOs more
closely resemble the standards that evolve in the free-market absent such
organizations. 6
An additional problem for the ITU is the need to harmonize the
interests of developing and industrialized nations. Developing nations may
not contribute heavily in terms of money and technical knowledge to the
ITU. However, developing nations have a right to vote for which standards
are adopted. If the ITU must reach consensus among all member nations,
it must address the concerns of developing countries. At the same time, the
needs of developing and industrialized nations differ in many instances. The
RSOs circumvent this problem by permitting only developed nations to
join.'
While RSOs resolve deadlock, incorporate the opinions of manufactur-
ers, users, and service providers, and exclude developing nations, their
proliferation does not imply that global standards are more likely to
emerge. RSOs promulgate regional standards.8 Reaching consensus
among the various RSOs may be as difficult to attain as consensus in the
ITU. Regardless of whether consensus among the RSOs is difficult or easy
to reach, the ITU's role is diminished. If agreement comes easily, the ITU
will have to concede to the standard supported by industrialized nations,
which fund the majority of the ITU's activities. If the RSOs will not
endorse a uniform standard, the ITU is not better equipped to formulate
one. 
89
B. Cost
The delays caused by the standard-setting procedures used by
organizations, such as the ITU and the ISO, have only added to the rising
costs of standardization. France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United
85. Id.
86. Id. at 320.
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 312.
89. Id. at 320.
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States each donate 9.3 million Swiss Francs per year to the ITU.9°
Moreover, Argentina, which hosted the first World Telecommunications
Development Conference in March 1994, spent $2.6 million for the event.
Member nations incurred additional expenses by sending representatives to
participate in the conference. 91
Perhaps the best example of the financial cost of institutional
standardization is the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) attempt
to select a standard for high-definition television (HDTV). Since 1987, the
wonders of HDTV have been discussed in the United States. HDTV offers
wide-screen television images with CD-quality sound.' HDTV may also
be able to store and retrieve electronic still pictures, permit two-way radio
communication, and receive programming in different formats from
broadcasters, cable, satellites, and fiber-optic lines.93 However, HDTV
has yet to be sold in the United States.
The FCC designated its Advisory Committee on Advanced Television
Service (ACATS) to recommend which manufacturer's HDTV standard
should be adopted. The ACATS solicited proposals from various electronic
manufacturers, receiving twenty-three proposals from fourteen electronic
producers. Manufacturers spent numerous dollars researching and
developing their proposals. For example, the Japanese invested over $700
million on their Multiple Sub-nyquist Encoding Transmission (MUSE)
proposal, which they eventually withdrew, because it was based on analog,
rather than digital technology.'
By 1991, the ACATS reduced the number of proposals to four. They
included one developed by AT&T and Zenith Electronics, two by General
Instruments and MIT, and one by North American Phillips, Thomson
Consumer Electronics, and the David Sarnoff Research Center. 5 The
90. Summit Poses Questions About JTU Role in the 1990s, supra note 80.
91. Id.
92. David Ehrlich, /DTV Update, PLAYBOY, July 1993, at 173, 173.
93. Hugh Carter Donahue, Choosing the TV of the Future: The Stakes are High in the
Search for a Broadcast Standard for High-Definition Television, TECH. REV., Apr. 1989,
at 30, 30.
94. Kenneth D. Springer, Note, High-Definition Television: New World Order or
Fortress U.S.A.?, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1309, 1309 (1993). For an extensive
bibliography on the development of HDTV standards, see HIGH-DEFINITION TELEVISION:
AN ANNOTATED MULTDISCIPLINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1981-1992 169-222 (James E.
Sudalnik et al., eds. 1994).
95. High Definition Television: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd. Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993)
(statement of Robert K. Graves, Vice-President, AT&T).
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ACATS and the Advanced TV Test Center (ATTC),96 a committee
comprised of major network producers and broadcast-related trade
associations, conducted tests to evaluate the four systems. The ATTC
planned to spend $13 to $15 million to build the test laboratory and
appraise the various systems. After the ATTC's preliminary testing, the
HDTV standard which performed the best would then undergo a series of
field tests. After such extensive testing, ACATS would then recommend a
standard to the FCC.97
However, after one and one-half years of testing, the ACATS
announced in February 1993 that it was unable to recommend any
system.98 Rather than authorize developers time to improve their products
and conduct a second round of testing, the ACATS proposed that the
various designers combine the strengths of their various standards. The
joint venture between the producers is now known as the "Grand
Alliance."" However, these manufacturers will have to invest additional
time and money, before the FCC will formally adopt the HDTV standard
of the "Grand Alliance."
C. Growing Trend Toward A Priori Decision Making
In the past, standard-setting organizations, such as the ITU and the
ISO, selected a universal standard from among those already used in the
market. Today, however, there is a growing trend among standard-setting
organizations and market participants to determine product standards before
they are marketed to consumers. The emphasis on achieving a world
standard has grown. Thus, it is argued all major competitors must have an
equal opportunity to contribute to and benefit from the adopted standard.
If a manufacturer has already invested significantly in a produced good,
and has created a loyal customer following, then standardization is less
likely to be achieved. The only way to avoid losses to all manufacturers is
to rely on a priori decision making."°
However, as the HDTV example indicates, a priori decision making
may have negative ramifications on technological development. Manufac-
turers were ready to introduce HDTV to the American public in 1988.
96. Chris McConnell, ATV Comes Out on Top of NTSC in Field Tests, BRDCST. &
CABLE, Sept. 26, 1994, at 56, 56.
97. Randall Sukow, State of the Art: Television Technology, BRDcsT, Oct. 15, 1990,
at 42, 44.
98. Ehrlich, supra note 92, at 173.
99. High Definition Television: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd. Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1993)
(Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service).
100. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 70, at 21.
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Japan first began HDTV broadcasting in that year.'' It used its MUSE
system to broadcast the 1988 Summer Olympics to eighty-one sites in
Japan."° Japan then began continuous HDTV broadcasting in 1989.103
The retardation of technology, however, is not the only negative
consequence of a priori decision making. A standard may be adopted too
quickly. It may not be technologically feasible to manufacture a product
using the recommended standard. Moreover, decisionmakers may not have
envisioned future difficulties when selecting a particular standard."' The
Red Book standard for CD-Audio and the Yellow Book standard for CD-
ROM are some examples.
The Red Book and Yellow Book standards began as a private
agreement between Sony and Phillips. The two manufacturers agreed to the
disc's chemical requirements, its dimensions, and its optical characteris-
tics. 11 Sony and Phillips agreed to these standards before the first CD
was ever sold. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
eventually adopted the Red and Yellow Book standards as the world-wide
standards for CDs.
The Red Book standard mandates that a disc should be at least 1.2
millimeters thick. Manufacturers may vary the disc's thickness within a
certain range: +0.3mm and -0.r1mm. However, shortages in raw materials
used to produce the discs have occurred. The polycarbonate base and the
aluminum metal component of the disc are now in short supply. Some
manufacturers have tested thinner discs. However, a thinner disc may have
a shorter life-span than a disc of 1.2 millimeters. Moreover, a thinner disc
may not be playable on all CD players." In this instance, reliance on a
priori decision making by private manufacturers and standard-setting
organizations prevented an accurate forecast of all potential problems in the
future.
D. Politicization
Political bargaining, not technological decision making, also often
dominates national and international standard-making bodies. National
technical organizations may support the formation of a universal standard.
101. Springer, supra note 94, at 1314.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1316.
104. Besen & Saloner, supra note 61, at 24.
105. CD Quality Standards: Not High Enough?, TAPE-DISC Bus., Aug. 1993, available
in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
106. Optical Raw Materials Quality Control, TAPE-DISC Bus., Nov. 1993, available in
LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
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However, a country may oppose a global standard if it is detrimental to the
political and economic interests of that country. This occurs when the
adoption of a national standard would protect domestic industries. The
development of international standards would cause a losing nation to
forfeit royalties from its domestically held patent rights. Moreover, a
national standard may symbolize a country's political and technological
power and independence from the rest of the world."°
Politics dominates national and international standardization organiza-
tions for several reasons. First, member nations designate which delegates
will represent them at the various international standards meetings. The
U.S. Department of State, Office of International Communications Policy,
governs which American delegates serve on the various sector committees
at the ITU. Second, these representatives, not the technical advisors,
ultimately select which standards, if any, are adopted."' 8 This allows
representatives to couch political arguments in technological terms.
Furthermore, commercial operators and manufacturers, such as AT&T,
Motorola, and British Telecom, lack voting privileges."° Third, these
designated representatives elect the directors of the key offices in
organizations such as the ITU and the ISO. These directors set the policy
agenda of the various organizations. Moreover, member nations financially
support the activities of these organizations. Standard-setting bodies, thus
cannot act independently from their major financial contributors.
This politicization hinders the development of international standards.
The inability of the ITU to adopt a global color television standard in 1965
is just one example. "' Three different color television systems emerged
as a result of the ITU's failure. National Television System Committee
(NTSC) system was developed by the Americans; Sequential A M~moire
(SECAM) by the French, and Phase Alternation by Line (PAL) by the
Germans."' Approximately 95 percent of the component parts of the
three systems are the same." 2 However, the way the color subcarrier is
modulated, and the number of horizontal lines the systems carry differ."3
These differences cause the incompatibility.
The desire of French politicians to protect France's technological
industry and to develop an export market to the non-Western world
107. CRANE, supra note 55, at 7.
108. CERNI & GRAY, supra note 8, at 7.
109. Summit Poses Questions About ITU Role in the 1990s, supra note 80.
110. CRANE, supra note 55, at 8.
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 14-15.
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accounts for their resistance to an international standard.11 4 They also
feared the growing American technological dominance at that time." 5
The French viewed SECAM as one way to reassert its national power and
prestige. SECAM was a technology owned and developed by the French.
It symbolized French independence from American technology., 6
Moreover, the French economy stood to gain from the sale of license
rights and from the export of the SECAM system. The export market
included all countries except the United States, Japan, and Canada. Those
three countries had already adopted the NTSC system as their standard.
Had France agreed to adopt the American standard, it would have forfeited
potential export markets and license sales. Moreover, France would have
had to pay the United States license fees to produce the NTSC system."7
A more recent example of the effect of politics on standardization
decisions is the FCC's attempt to select an HDTV standard. The United
States currently imports a significant number of consumer electronic
products. In 1990, the United States had a $12 billion trade deficit in this
area."' Americans feared the dominance Japan and other Asian nations
enjoy in the manufacturing and the development of consumer electronics
products." 9 American politicians have, thus, presented HDTV as the last
opportunity to salvage the American consumer electronics industry.'
The American government has also justified its involvement in the
selection of an HDTV standard to secure the creation of American
jobs.' The Economic Policy Institute estimated that if American
manufacturers capture 50 percent of the domestic market, then a $10 billion
trade surplus would result. Moreover, HDTV, it argued, would create
millions of American jobs.' The Electronic Industries Association (EIA)
projected 232,000 jobs would be created." Moreover, U.S. Labor
Secretary Robert Reich has stated that the number of American jobs created
114. Id. at 39.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 45.
117. Id.
118. Springer, supra note 94, at 1311.
119. Id. at 1309, 1314.
120. See Al Gore, Implications of HDTV on U.S. Policy, in HDTV: THE PoLITICs,
POLICIES, AND ECONOMICS OF ToMoRRow's TELEVISION 189-90 (John F. Rice ed., 1990).
121. Springer, supra note 94, at 1322; see generally HDTV: THE POLITICS, POLICIES,
AND ECONOMICS OF TOMORROW'S TELEvISION (John F. Rice ed., 1990).
122. J.J. Barry, HDT V: America's Last Chance to Remain Competitive ? in HDTV: THE
POLITICS, POLICIES, AND ECONOMICS OF TOMMOROw's TELEVISION 143, 145 (John F.
Rice ed., 1990).
123. Joanne Connelly, HDTV: Who Speaks for U.S. Industry?, ELECTRONIC NEwS, Jan.
23, 1989, at 1, 1.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
by a particular HDTV standard should affect which standard the FCC
ultimately selects. 24
Politicians, therefore, have pushed for a standard created by
Americans. However, some argue that the selection of a foreign standard
will not affect the domestic television industry significantly. Foreign
television manufacturers already produce, in the United States, the majority
of their sets sold in the United States."Z This is because the cathode ray
picture tubes used in television receivers are costly to ship.'26 Clearly, the
political clamor surrounding HDTV in the United States has slowed the
adoption of an HDTV standard and the introduction of this new technology
into the American market. In fact, EIA Consumer Electronics Vice-
President Gary Shapiro has challenged the FCC to set an HDTV standard
by the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta."2
IV. SOME FACTORS AFFECTING STANDARDIZATION
The delays, cost, and politicization associated with standard-setting
bodies result, in part, because all parties involved-users, service
providers, and manufacturers-want to minimize their personal losses and
maximize their private gains. During the standardization process, these
private interests cause conflict which prevents compatibility. Economists
Stanley M. Besen and Garth Saloner identify the two principal factors
affecting the standard-setting process: the private incentives of interested
parties to promote the universal adoption of a particular standard and the
extent those parties differ over which standard they should adopt."
Having identified the two principal factors affecting the standard-
setting process, Besen and Saloner derive four economic models; three are
relevant to a discussion about the weaknesses of cooperative standard-
setting bodies. The first is when all parties have a significant interest in
adopting a compatible standard and have similar preferences as to which
technology they adopt. All parties agree to one standard, because each
party's own interests are maximized by the selection of a universal
standard. This is known as the Pure Coordination Case. Most standard-
setting bodies, such as the ITU and the ISO, assume all participants in
those organizations approach the process with significant interest in and
124. Peter Lambert, Reich Enters HDTVFrayAs Talks Continue, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Mar. 15, 1993, at 25, 25.
125. Springer, supra note 94, at 1333.
126. Id.
127. Clarion Call: Launch HDTV By 1996 Atlanta Olympics, Shapiro Urges FCC,
COMM. DAILY, Apr. 20, 1993, at 6, 6.
128. Besen & Saloner, supra note 61, at 3-4.
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similar preferences for a universal standard. However, these organizations
overlook the Pure Private Goods and Conflict Cases Besen and Saloner
identify.2 9
The Pure Private Goods Case occurs when market participants have
large differences in the technology they prefer. The parties have little
economic incentive to formulate a standard. This leads to stalemate and
failure to adopt a standard. In a market without a dominant manufacturer,
producers use the standardization process to either promote their own
technologies or block the adoption of another's standard. No compromise
is ever reached.
However, a dominant producer in the market does not guarantee
standardization will occur. A dominant firm will not seek an industry
standard if it believes that its competitors will benefit from standardization.
For example, consumer demand for a competitor's product might increase
and lower the demand for the dominant manufacturer's good. The Pure
Private Goods Case thus leads to three possible outcomes: incompatible
standards, the adoption of the dominant manufacturer as a de facto market
standard, or failure to develop a technology. 130
In the Conflict Case, producers differ sharply over which standard
they should adopt. However, all participants want a standard to emerge. If
a dominant manufacturer exists in this market, the standard of that
producer will emerge as the de facto standard. If no dominant player exists,
market participants will engage in standardization. Manufacturers will form
coalitions and offer side payments to the opposing producers. Absent the
use of coalitions and side payments, manufacturers will not develop an
industry-wide standard.' 3'
The NAFTA, similar to the ITU and the ISO, is based on the
assumption that all participants in the standard-setting process want
universal standards and that little differences exist about which standards
should emerge. That assumption is correct where the United States,
Mexico, and Canada are concerned. The NAFTA allows American
manufacturers to participate directly in the development of standards in
Canada and Mexico on the same basis as domestic firms in those
countries.' However, developments in European Union (EU) case law
suggest that greater conflict exists over which standards should emerge at
the global level.
129. Id. at 5-7.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. Id. at 9-10.
132. Anne M. Driscoll, Key Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
Bus. AM., Oct. 9, 1992, at 3, 7.
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The EU has encouraged its member nations to use "to the maximum"
international standards and recommendations.' 33 However, unlike the
NAFTA, the EU has not required member nations to adopt international
standards."3 In fact, the Cassis de Dijon3 ' case held that absent EU
regulation, member states may determine technical standards.'36 They are
limited only by the requirement that the standards are "necessary to satisfy
mandatory requirements."' 37
A broad reading of Cassis de Dijon creates the presumption that goods
legally made in one member state are entitled to free trade in any other EU
member state. 8 This notion of "mutual recognition"'39 certainly pro-
motes free trade, and one of the consequences of the Cassis de Dijon
decision is the enhancement of consumer choice." However, standard-
ization by definition limits consumer choice, and the principle for which
Cassis stands is antithetical to the notion of uniformity upon which the
NAFTA is based.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States, Mexico, and Canada need to address the
weaknesses of the NAFTA treaty in the telecommunications area with
respect to its exclusive reliance on international standard-setting organiza-
tions. Changes must occur at two levels. At the treaty level, the NAFTA
133. Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final at
103.
134. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute strives to develop common
ground between the 12 member nations on various standardization issues, but neither
mandates that they accept its suggested standards nor that they adopt the standards of the
ITU and ISO. Fraidoon Mazda, Standardizing on Standards: European Perspectives,
TELECOMM., Sept. 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
135. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649; STEPHEN WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw: THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO THE LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993). Although Cassis
de Dijon was decided years before Towards a Dynamic European Economy was issued, it
remains good law until the harmonization of all EU member nations' legislation regarding
product composition. See Case C-412/93, Sociiti d'Importation Idouard Leclerc-Siplic v.
TF1 Publiciti SA and Another, 1995 All ER 343.
136. WEATHERHILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 135, at 430.
137. Id. at 431. Mandatory requirements are national laws limiting free trade which are
justified on the grounds of public morality, public policy, national security, and the
protection of citizens, animals, plants, national treasures, or commercial property. Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 36, 261 U.N.T.S.
140.
138. Id. at 432.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 436.
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must be amended to allow member nations to opt out of the cooperative
standard-setting process if international standard-setting bodies have not
promulgated a standard within two years. The automatic opt-out clause
could in turn be used to apply pressure to these standard-setting bodies to
adopt reforms needed to reduce delays and decrease cost at the global level.
A. An Automatic Opt-out Clause
Currently, the NAFTA gives its signatory members a limited right not
to rely on the decisions of international standards organizations. Article
905(1) of the NAFTA enables nations to formulate their own standard
when international standards "would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means to fulfill its legitimate objectives, for example because of fundamen-
tal climatic, geographical, technological or infrastructural factors, scientific
justification or the level of protection that the Party considers appropri-
ate. "141
However, member nations have to justify such behavior to the Free
Trade Commission, comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the other
member nations." While such a procedure forces member states to
adhere to the treaty, it only increases the cost and delay to achieve
standardization if protracted litigation ensues. Furthermore, it delays the
significant impact free market forces could have on the standardization
process.
An automatic opt-out clause would give international standard-setting
bodies two years to promulgate a standard. Two years would allow
standardization to occur at a global level as the NAFTA envisions. If,
however, no standard emerges during that time, the clause would allow
member states to form regional standards and to take advantage of the
bandwagon effect 43 likely to occur on the free market. The clause would
also avoid the litigation that Article 905(1) entails, reducing cost and delay.
Furthermore, under this system, NAFTA members would enjoy a
hybrid system of standardization. International standards bodies and free
market forces together increase the chances of achieving compatibility. In
a hybrid system, NAFTA members can insist that standardization
committees adopt their standard or, as the treaty envisions, must concede
141. NAFTA, supra note 3, at art. 905(1).
142. Id. at art. 2001.
143. The bandwagon effect results when users in the market quickly adopt new
technology. Compatibility and interoperability are so highly valued that once some users
switch to the new technology all others must also adopt it. Besen & Saloner, supra note 61,
at 23-24.
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to another standard adopted by the organization.1" However, absent a
standard in two years, NAFTA members can allow its market participants
to adopt standards by themselves. Moreover, given the fact that American
manufacturers may participate directly in Canada and Mexico on the same
basis as domestic firms in those countries, it is unlikely that multiple and
incompatible standards will emerge. This hybrid system, in effect, offers
two opportunities for standards to arise.145
B. Structural Reforms of the ITU and the ISO
An automatic opt-out clause, however, does not address the weakness-
es of international standard-setting bodies such as the ITU and the ISO.
Three structural reforms also are needed to reduce the delay, cost, and
politicization associated with these international organizations. First, these
organizations should give RSOs voting privileges. Second, members with
voting privileges should be limited to RSOs, and third, developing nations
and other interested parties should be given an opportunity to comment on
proposed standards to the voting members.
RSOs should have voting privileges for several reasons. RSOs allow
more participants in the standardization process. For example, private
manufacturers and their engineers may contribute to the standard-setting
process. The expertise and experience that manufacturers bring to the
process could avoid some of the problems when a priori decision making
is used by international standard-setting bodies. In addition, including the
voice of manfacturers at the international level would reduce the influence
of governmental representatives, but would not exclude their concerns from
the process.
RSOs also should have exclusive voting privileges within these
international standard-setting bodies. Under this system, RSOs could take
proposed international standards back to their regional members for a vote.
The RSOs would rely on their own voting procedures to break ties and
deadlocks. Procedures currently in place were specifically designed to
circumvent the problems that have arisen at the ITU. Limiting voting rights
to RSOs would further reduce delays and cost by streamlining decision
making.
Finally, developing nations and other concerned parties should be
given an opportunity to comment on proposed international standards.
Industrialized nations should know about the concerns and problems that
developing nations face when creating a telecommunications infrastructure.
144. Id. at 24.
145. Id.
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Voting members should consider the impact suggested standards will have
on those nations. However, industrialized countries who fund the majority
of the ITU's activities should not be limited and delayed by developing
nations. Allowing these nations to comment on proposed standards would
give them an opportunity to be heard while reducing the average* time
needed to promulgate an international standard.
CONCLUSION
The NAFTA has resulted in two significant changes in the American
telecommunications industry. Provisions of the treaty require the United
States to promulgate standards mandated by international standard-setting
organizations and force the telecommunications industry to utilize
cooperative standard-setting as the exclusive means by which to achieve
standardization. The NAFTA mandates these organizations play a critical
role in the era of free trade in North America and around the world.
However, without pressure by the NAFTA's signatory members to adopt
structural changes, these organizations lack the ability to be a significant
factor in the free trade era. Exclusive reliance on these standard-setting
bodies in their current form can only mean delays, high cost, and the
retardation of innovative technology to American telecommunication
manufacturers, users, and service providers.
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